Political Friendship and the Good Life: Two Liberal Arguments Against Perfectionism

This title is printed to order. This book may have been self-published. If so, we cannot guarantee the quality of the content. In the main most books will have gone through the editing process however some may not. We therefore suggest that you be aware of this before ordering this book. If in doubt check either the author or publisher’s details as we are unable to accept any returns unless they are faulty. Please contact us if you have any questions.

The main subject of this book is the rather fascinating link between an acceptable concept of political whole and its legal and moral implications. When we face this problem, we find that widespread categories like ‘happiness’ and friendship are at the same time necessary and dangerous, crucial and elusive. In order to make the case against the so-called Legal Enforcement of Morals, and to grasp the complex relationship between law and morality from a liberal point of view, it is not enough to reject a pattern of happiness, or of human flourishing, from which to draw normative instructions for men and women - it must be recognized that integration of individuals in the comprehensive groups, as well as in the political whole itself, is not the only valuable option. The fragile value of a relative lack of integration, a right to unhappiness , turns out to be, eventually, what makes the weak, but decisive, moral primacy of liberal societies.