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This book examines the implications of deploying missile defenses by the United States and Russia within the current and next decades. Noting that U.S. plans to locate parts of the global ballistic missile defense system in eastern Europe contributed to a deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations, Cimbala discusses how a post-Bush/post-Putin era could open the door either to improved détente or increased acrimony over such issues as missile defenses and NATO enlargement, the fate of the CFE and INF treaties, and U.S. hegemony in world politics. He considers how stable the U.S.-Russian nuclear deterrence and arms control relationship might be once the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty levels are reached, and whether the two states could reduce to a level of minimum deterrence forces and persuade other nuclear powers to reduce their inventories proportionately. AUTHOR: Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine, is the author of numerous works on national security policy, arms control, and conflict termination. 79 charts
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This book examines the implications of deploying missile defenses by the United States and Russia within the current and next decades. Noting that U.S. plans to locate parts of the global ballistic missile defense system in eastern Europe contributed to a deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations, Cimbala discusses how a post-Bush/post-Putin era could open the door either to improved détente or increased acrimony over such issues as missile defenses and NATO enlargement, the fate of the CFE and INF treaties, and U.S. hegemony in world politics. He considers how stable the U.S.-Russian nuclear deterrence and arms control relationship might be once the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty levels are reached, and whether the two states could reduce to a level of minimum deterrence forces and persuade other nuclear powers to reduce their inventories proportionately. AUTHOR: Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine, is the author of numerous works on national security policy, arms control, and conflict termination. 79 charts