Contract Delays: The Impact on Department of Defense Contractors’ Wealth

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The monetary incentives used to motivate DoD contractors’ schedule performance on Acquisition Category One programs afford them the opportunity as a whole to earn billions of dollars in addition to their contract award. These incentives are paid 85-90% of the time regardless of schedule performance. While these contractors are paid to avoid delays, there is an indication the delay increases the contractor’s stock value. This research tested the theory that contract delays significantly impact the company’s stock returns. The results found both positive and negative reactions to a firm’s value. Delays caused by budget cuts tend to have a negative impact on a company’s wealth, while delays for other reasons such as a restructure or redesign tend to have a positive impact. The findings illustrate that shareholders are aware the impact delays could have on a program and react accordingly and quickly to the market. Undeniably contractors cannot control the program’s funding however; there is no incentive for a contractor to avoid other types of delays because of the wealth it generates for the company.