The Effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive

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Many air power proponents entered World War II with the belief that air power alone would bring Germany to its knees and force capitulation. This was not the official purpose of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). This thought combined with the fact that the CBO did not produce a decisive victory often over shadows the fact that the CBO achieved its objectives and more. The official objective of the CBO was to reduce Germany s means to resist by establishing and exploiting air superiority, thus allowing the invasion of the continent in the spring of 1944. Despite the fact that the CBO did not produce a decisive victory over Germany, it was a decisive factor in the defeat of Germany. In order to understand how the CBO was effective one must examine both the intended and indirect effects of the operation. The intended effects resulted from CBO attacks against the German aircraft industry, transportation industry and infrastructure, and industrial system. However, the effects of these attacks rippled throughout the Third Reich. The unintended consequences of these direct attacks hampered Germany s capabilities to conduct war. The intended effects along with the indirect effects of the attacks best demonstrate how the CBO was effective.