On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda and affiliated jihadist organizations declared war on the United States. Since that day, the U.S. government has initiated a series of policies, legislation and actions to confront the new threat. Seven years into the war, there is growing criticism of the structure and approach the U.S. has adopted to defeat Al-Qaeda and the Salifist jihad organizations that support it. This monograph explores the basis of this criticism and determines whether or not the United States has the institutional structure, human resources and polices required to project the full complement of diplomatic, military, intelligence resources required to defeat Al-Qaeda and the global Salafist jihad that it represents. The monograph tracks changes in U.S. legislation, organizational structure, and actions mounted to contain and defeat Al-Qaeda since the 9/11 attacks. It presents non-classified evidence regarding the effectiveness of these changes to identify, interdict and neutralize Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups and records how Al-Qaeda has responded. The monograph concludes with a set of recommended strategic and global adjustments to the U.S. global war on terrorism required to defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist network. The monograph opens with an evaluation of Al-Qaeda’s origins and cause, its recruiting base and methods, its cellular structure and operating procedures, and its financial assets including the sources of its funding, how funds are moved and managed, and how these funds are used to support the global Salafist jihad that Al-Qaeda embodies. This is followed by an analysis of the U.S. government structure and capabilities available to meet the challenged posed by Al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attacks. The monograph then turns to examine both the short and long-term responses of the U.S. government to the attacks. Analysis focuses on efforts undertaken by the intelligence and law enforcement communities, the U.S. military and the dipl
