The challenges of modernization for any military in the contemporary operating environment are difficult with even the most professional and well-financed of militaries. Not only are the costs of research and development prohibitive in attempting to address the entire spectrum of evolving threats, but the consequences of making the wrong decisions can betray the US Army its most precious commodity; the lives of its soldiers. This study examines the current US Army efforts at cavalry transformation and some of the assumptions supporting this transformation. This study questions whether any recent historical examples in maneuver warfare actually support the logic behind the recent decisions to radically alter the role of cavalry. This study poses the central question: Are the new reconnaissance squadrons adequately equipped or organized to answer the needs of the new modular brigade combat teams? This thesis examines what some of the most significant examples of mechanized cavalry operations over the last sixty-five years demonstrate regarding the fundamental linkages between reconnaissance and security in modern maneuver warfare. Exposing some of the flawed assumptions imbedded in current transformation efforts is a worthy exercise, as is also the consideration of how to best adjust these new reconnaissance squadrons to make them more capable.