This study examines the ongoing Greece-Turkey conflict and the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords in an effort to determine whether or not the successful 1978 approach can be modified and adapted to bring peace to Greece and Turkey. The focus throughout the thesis is on the military perspective. The methodology used to develop the study is a historical, descriptive comparison approach. The analysis begins with a historical review of all the issues that form the current Greek-Turkish dispute. This is followed by an examination of the importance of these two NATO allies to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Included in this discussion is a detailed look at the Soviet Union’s regional interests and the methods the Soviets currently use to expand their influence in the region. Balancing the Soviet perspective is a review of United States’ relations with Greece and Turkey, which also includes addressing United States regional interests. The final block of the historical analysis is a review and study of the domestic and international situations that led Egypt and Israel to sign the Camp David Accords. The conclusion of the historical study contains an examination of the Camp David negotiating process and the Accords themselves. The subsequent descriptive comparison and integration of the Camp David model with the Greece-Turkey conflict divides the hostile issues into three categories (security, territorial and economic) and then compares the two cases to determine their likeness. After running this comparison, the study concludes that the Greek-Turkish dispute is analogous to the situation that faced Egypt and Israel prior to the Camp David Summit. It further concludes that the Camp David approach will work in the Aegean if properly adapted to the situation. The final analysis indicates that the United States cannot afford for the ongoing dispute to continue unabated.