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The U.S. Army, after years of false starts and unfilled promises, is about to make good on its commitment to field an unmanned aerial vehicle system at the maneuver brigade level. Called the Shadow 200 tactical UAV (TUAV), it promises to dramatically enhance the reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities of those at the tip of the proverbial spear by providing them the ability to gather information on enemy formations with a limited risk to men and materiel. For approximately $3million, this program will put three aircraft, and associated support systems, in the hands of each brigade to fulfill those dull, dirty, and dangerous reconnaissance tasks currently challenging the brigade's reconnaissance and surveillance architecture. As compelling as this capability promises to be, the question remains as to whether the Shadow TUAV is the right tool for the wrong job. This monograph asks should the U.S. Army alter its current UAV acquisition strategy for maneuver brigades from one in which limited numbers of high capability systems are acquired, in favor of another that fields a large quantity of less capable mini-UAVs? A UAV system built around mini-UAVs, essentially smaller, less capable, but much cheaper versions of the more conventional aircraft, has inherent strengths that support its adoption at the brigade level. As a system, the sheer quantity of deployed collection assets, inherent design austerity, and flexible organization give them a significant advantage in fulfilling the requirements of a brigade level UAV system than their more conventional UAV cousins. They will allow a future prospective brigade commander to see more, with more, at less overall cost. To support this conclusion, this monograph will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of both the current UAV acquisition plan and a proposed mini-UAV strategy, compare the two systems in relation to the design parameters established for a brigade level UAV, then marry the results of
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