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This monograph is a theoretical and historical discussion of the culminating point. Initially, the author discusses the theoretical contributions that Clausewitz, Jomini, and Tukhachevskiy have had on the subject. Departing from this theoretical base, the author analyzes two major historical campaigns, the Soviet winter offensive in January 1943 to trap Army Group Manstein, and the race to the Dnepr in September 1943. The author analyzes these campaigns using the Colonel Huba Wass De Czege combat power model to identify the factors of culmination. The author concludes that the factors contributing to the culmination of combat power are too numerous and vary too rapidly to allow for an accurate prediction of the culminating point during the campaign's planning phase. But the author does value the consideration of the culminating point during both the campaign planning and execution phases. This discussion on how to affect culmination offers some suggestions on how operational level leaders and their staffs can influence the culminating point. This monograph is the initial process in identifying and defining the culminating point. It provides a point of departure for further discussion and research on a new concept introduced in the current U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.
This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.
As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
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This monograph is a theoretical and historical discussion of the culminating point. Initially, the author discusses the theoretical contributions that Clausewitz, Jomini, and Tukhachevskiy have had on the subject. Departing from this theoretical base, the author analyzes two major historical campaigns, the Soviet winter offensive in January 1943 to trap Army Group Manstein, and the race to the Dnepr in September 1943. The author analyzes these campaigns using the Colonel Huba Wass De Czege combat power model to identify the factors of culmination. The author concludes that the factors contributing to the culmination of combat power are too numerous and vary too rapidly to allow for an accurate prediction of the culminating point during the campaign's planning phase. But the author does value the consideration of the culminating point during both the campaign planning and execution phases. This discussion on how to affect culmination offers some suggestions on how operational level leaders and their staffs can influence the culminating point. This monograph is the initial process in identifying and defining the culminating point. It provides a point of departure for further discussion and research on a new concept introduced in the current U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.
This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.
As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.