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This title is printed to order. This book may have been self-published. If so, we cannot guarantee the quality of the content. In the main most books will have gone through the editing process however some may not. We therefore suggest that you be aware of this before ordering this book. If in doubt check either the author or publisher’s details as we are unable to accept any returns unless they are faulty. Please contact us if you have any questions.
This monograph reviews the experiences of the US Army in planning and conducting rear operations during the Korean War and examines our current rear operations doctrine in light of these experiences. This review is significant because doctrine is developed based upon an army's war experiences or the wartime conditions it expects to encounter. During the Korean War the experiences of many leaders in the Army, and especially those of the Army staff in Washington, were grounded in the campaigns against the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Europe during World War II. It was natural to assume that these leaders'; experiences would color their decisions regarding doctrine and force structure. In fighting the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) our army faced an enemy trained in the tactics of the Soviet Army and experienced what our current force may see in a future conflict. An analysis of these experiences may offer some insights into the requirements for an effective rear operations doctrine and its related tactics designed to fight Soviet deep operations. The study's analysis reviews both the US Army's and the NKPA's doctrines and tactics for rear operations and guerrilla warfare, respectively.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.
This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.
As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
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This title is printed to order. This book may have been self-published. If so, we cannot guarantee the quality of the content. In the main most books will have gone through the editing process however some may not. We therefore suggest that you be aware of this before ordering this book. If in doubt check either the author or publisher’s details as we are unable to accept any returns unless they are faulty. Please contact us if you have any questions.
This monograph reviews the experiences of the US Army in planning and conducting rear operations during the Korean War and examines our current rear operations doctrine in light of these experiences. This review is significant because doctrine is developed based upon an army's war experiences or the wartime conditions it expects to encounter. During the Korean War the experiences of many leaders in the Army, and especially those of the Army staff in Washington, were grounded in the campaigns against the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Europe during World War II. It was natural to assume that these leaders'; experiences would color their decisions regarding doctrine and force structure. In fighting the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) our army faced an enemy trained in the tactics of the Soviet Army and experienced what our current force may see in a future conflict. An analysis of these experiences may offer some insights into the requirements for an effective rear operations doctrine and its related tactics designed to fight Soviet deep operations. The study's analysis reviews both the US Army's and the NKPA's doctrines and tactics for rear operations and guerrilla warfare, respectively.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.
This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.
As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.