Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social\nconstruct–or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The\nlegitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both\nneuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this,\nin Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of\nself is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He\ninvestigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness,\nand selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be\nunderstood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi\nargues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus\non the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and\nSelfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining\nto the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light\nof contemporary discussions in consciousness research.Philosophical\nphenomenology–as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre,\nMerleau-Ponty, and others–not only addresses crucial issues often\nabsent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a\nconceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills\nthe need–given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical\ninterest in subjectivity–for an account of the subjective or\nphenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to\nresearchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is\nto use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central\nimportance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental\npsychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other\nphilosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology\ncan demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.

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