Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity, Michael P. Lynch (9780262621557) — Readings Books
Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity
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Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity

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Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naive. The opposition frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there in only one true story of the world. Both sides agree there is no middle path. Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about the truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops a version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism . He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or soft concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be.

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Format
Paperback
Publisher
MIT Press Ltd
Country
United States
Date
15 September 2001
Pages
196
ISBN
9780262621557

Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naive. The opposition frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there in only one true story of the world. Both sides agree there is no middle path. Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about the truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops a version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism . He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or soft concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be.

Read More
Format
Paperback
Publisher
MIT Press Ltd
Country
United States
Date
15 September 2001
Pages
196
ISBN
9780262621557