Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectic thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectic reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one’s times and at best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In this volume May Sim gathers together experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretative possibilities. The contributors include Allan Back, J.D.G. Evans, Michael Ferejohn, Eugene Garver, Lenn E. Goodman and Martha Husain.