Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962

According to the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference regarding Vietnam, general elections were to be held in July 1956 that would lead to the reunification of North and South Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement, however, was doomed from the start, as the South Vietnamese leaders did not subscribe to it and the leaders of the Communist North saw its value as primarily a propaganda tool. By 1956 it was obvious to all that reunification in accordance with the agreement was impossible, and the North Vietnamese looked to China for advice and assistance.

Based on Vietnamese, Chinese, American and British sources–many only recently made available–this work examines Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early stages of the second Indochina conflict. The progression of the Vietnamese Communists’ goals from primarily political to essentially military is traced. The book shows that the Hanoi government was remarkably in control of its own decision-making.