Philosophy Of Sociality The Shared Point Of View

Philosophers and social scientists constantly advance claims about the beliefs, desires, feelings, and intentions of groups. But these claims are puzzling--they cannot be true literally, as groups have no minds/brains so they cannot exhibit mental states in the same way as persons. Tuomela's task is to make sense of these ascriptions, to explain what they mean, and to show what is presupposed by such talk. Tuomela (Univ. of Helsinki) does this by developing a theory of what he calls the "we perspective" and "collective intentionality." He argues that this perspective is distinct from the collection of the mental states of individuals, but he avoids metaphysical extravagances such as the claim that there is literally a group mind. The first part of the book develops the theory, and the second part shows how the theory can explain what is required for membership in a group, the nature of cooperation, collective responsibility, and other basic ideas concerning groups and their behavior. The book's terminology is somewhat idiosyncratic, but that is for greater precision and clarity. Tuomela provides some fine historical and sociological examples, but at bottom this is a rigorous, carefully developed exposition. It is a highly original and significant contribution to an important philosophical problem.